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Shipping Lines Stay Cautious on Hormuz Reopening as 38 Japanese-Linked Vessels Remain Stranded

Source: Reuters / PortCalls Asia · 2026-06-15 · 7 min read
中文

Supply Chain Action Points

Read this first — the conclusion, and the moves to make:

  1. Within five business days, obtain a vessel-by-vessel status on your Gulf exposure: loaded or ballast, on hire or off hire, cargo sold or unsold. Cover 100% of hulls, no estimates.
  2. Make the written cover note, not the agreement, the trigger for booking any Hormuz transit, and hold that rule for the next 90 days.
  3. Budget on two clocks: freight normalisation in two to three months, feedstock availability in the first half of 2027. Two lines, reviewed separately, no blended assumption.
  4. Price the mine-clearance delay as a range behind the announcement, using a self-set lag of four to six weeks, and hold hire for that period on any June or July cargo.
  5. Do not reprice freight assumptions off the first week of movements; keep the crisis-level provision until at least ten vessels of your size class have transited with cover in place.
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Summary

Japanese shippers welcomed the US-Iran peace agreement but are awaiting more details and mine clearance before allowing ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The Japanese Shipowners' Association said 38 Japanese-linked vessels remain stranded in the Gulf and noted reports of mines in the area, stating they cannot simply resume operations based on the announcement alone. Shipfinder data showed only one vessel entering and five exiting the strait on June 15, primarily smaller chemical tankers and cargo vessels. Lloyd's List reported that shipping companies and insurers are in no rush to return, with S&P Global Energy noting it will take time for comfort and insurance to be in place. A full return to pre-crisis normalcy is expected to take two to three months, with oil supply not returning to pre-March levels until H1 2027.

The Analysis

One vessel in, five out, on 15 June. That is the entire throughput of the Strait of Hormuz in the Shipfinder data being read as a reopening. Thirty-eight Japanese-linked vessels are still inside the Gulf. The Japanese Shipowners' Association says it is waiting for more detail and for mine clearance and will not move on the announcement alone. Shipping companies and insurers are in no hurry. Full normalcy, two to three months. Oil supply back to pre-March levels, not before the first half of 2027.

Put those two dates next to each other and the story changes shape. The channel recovers inside a quarter. The cargo does not recover for another three quarters after that. Anyone budgeting both on one assumption will be wrong about one of them, and it will be the expensive one.

The six movements on 15 June also deserve a second look before anyone calls them a trend. A day is not a rate.

Thirty-eight is a stock, and a stock is the least useful number in a disruption. What matters is the split: how many of the 38 are loaded and how many are in ballast, how many are on time charter with hire still running, how many are waiting for a cargo that has already been sold twice. A loaded ship on hire with a buyer waiting is a loss that accrues daily. An empty ship waiting for orders is an option that costs money to hold. The same headline count, two completely different financial objects, and the article does not split them.

The one-day flow is both better and worse than it looks, depending on which half you read. Five out of 38 is 13% of the stranded fleet in a single day, which sounds like a dam breaking. The five were primarily smaller chemical tankers and cargo vessels. The small, simple, easily insured units went first. That is exactly what you would expect, and it is exactly why the count flatters: the hulls that carry the value and the ones with the most complicated cover are still inside. Do not extrapolate a sample of six movements into a clearance schedule. If the pace held linearly the 38 would be out in about eight days, and it will not hold, because the easy ones have already gone.

Mine clearance is the blank in the timetable, and the blank is the most expensive part of the document. The agreement has a date. The clearance has no published completion date in anything we have. A date plus a blank is not a schedule, it is an intention. Insurance does not underwrite intentions, which is why the shipowners' association is right to say it cannot resume on the announcement alone, and why the insurers' language about comfort carries more weight than the political language. The binding constraint on the first transit is a cover note, not a communiqué.

Here is what the diplomatic coverage buries. Shipping normalcy in two to three months and oil supply in the first half of 2027 are not the same recovery wearing two hats. The strait reopens, the hulls move, the insurance normalises, and the barrels still do not reach the March run rate for another three quarters. Freight on the outbound leg can be back to normal while your feedstock cost is still elevated, and the two are driven by different things: freight by queue and cover, feedstock by production and inventory rebuild. Hedge them together and one leg of the hedge will be wrong for six months. On a large import book that is not a rounding error, it is the whole variance.

Who hurts first depends on how they buy, not on how big they are. A refinery or a petrochemical plant buying delivered sees this inside a supplier price and experiences it as a slow, unexplained step-up with no line item to argue with. A buyer on FOB with their own charter sees hire and war risk in detail, weekly, and can actually negotiate. A smaller buyer with one or two parcels a year is barely exposed to the shipping economics at all; the exposure is availability, and availability is set by the people holding term contracts. Scale does not change the direction of the cost. It changes whether you can see it coming.

Watch the sequence rather than the date, because each step has its own trigger and none of them is the one the headlines are watching. The announcement, which we have. The cover note, where underwriters price the residual mine risk and which will lag the news by weeks because they want a survey rather than a press release. The first escorted movement, small and probably chemical carriers again. Rate normalisation on the outbound leg. And then, much later, the cargo. Four of those five are insurance and queue events. Only the first is political.

Put a number on the waiting, with the assumption stated. Assume $20,000 a day per vessel for hire and operating cost, which is my illustrative figure and not something the article reports. Thirty-eight vessels at that rate is $760,000 a day, about $22.8 million a month, roughly $68 million across the three months to normalcy. The total moves with the assumption, so do not budget the total. Budget the daily accrual, because that is the part that runs every day the agreement is signed and the cover note is not issued, and no announcement stops the meter.

Treating the agreement as the trigger is the mistake that costs the most. Book tonnage before the insurance is written and the counterfactual is not a sunk ship, it is a fixture you cannot cover, a laytime argument about a delay that was entirely foreseeable, and a cargo committed at a price built on a normal transit that did not happen. The announcement is a political event. Your exposure is an insurance event. Between them sits a survey nobody has scheduled.

Partial flow is not a rate signal. Five small tankers leaving is a test batch, not a market. Reprice your freight assumptions off the first week and you will cut the provision just before the second wave of mine reports and the first big hull that cannot get cover. Hold the provision at crisis level until the cover note arrives and let the saving show up late rather than early, because the early version of that saving is not a saving, it is an unbooked liability.

Thirty-eight ships are not stuck because a deal was not signed. They are stuck because a deal was signed and nobody has swept the water. The lock line here is not a rate and it is not a date. It is written cover for your vessel class. Until that document exists, the number in the budget stays at the crisis level, and the only thing worth renegotiating is how long you are willing to pay for it.

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— By Vivian Zhao

Strait of HormuzJapan shippingmine clearanceinsurancevessel strandingcautious return